Bank acquisition determinants: implications for small business credit

Bank mergers

Banks as real estate brokers -- letting free enterprise work

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

Has the housing boom increased mortgage risk?

Adjustable rate mortgages

Auditing the auditors: oversight or overkill?

A growing number of high-profile companies have had to restate their earnings at substantially lower levels to correct the prior use of "aggressive" and even fraudulent accounting practices. Because the companies’ auditors approved the original reports, policymakers have questioned the capacity of public accounting firms to promote fair financial reporting. In response, recent legislation has instituted several reforms, including the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which together with the Securities and Exchange Commission will investigate alleged lapses in accounting practices. But how much oversight is really necessary? Jeffery Gunther and Robert Moore examine recent events in the light of research findings. Based on this analysis, they conclude that market forces have tended, over time, to shape the role of auditors to match or correspond to the needs of investors in monitoring individual companies’ performance. Despite current sentiment to the contrary, substantial government involvement in the business of auditing appears to be needed only when other types of government intervention, such as bank deposit insurance, have already disrupted market-based incentives for effective audits. In the more typical situation, both government and industry policymakers should avoid restrictive measures that unnecessarily increase audit costs, instead taking into account market forces’ successful track record in disciplining ineffective auditors and promoting an effective audit function.>Securities and Exchange Commission ; Accounting

Early warning models in real time

Each quarter, banks file a call report, or Report of Condition and Income, containing hundreds of accounting items pertaining to their financial condition. Because call reports are filed quarterly, whereas banks are typically examined about once every twelve to eighteen months, statistical early warning models using call report data potentially provide a more up-to-date picture of a bank's condition than on-site exams alone. Often neglected, however, is the fact that call report data are subject to revision. We find evidence of a strong relationship between on-site exams and call report revisions. In addition, we evaluate a major class of early warning models using both originally published and revised data to assess whether model accuracy in real time is appreciably lower than accuracy measured using revised data. The findings indicate revised data overstate the accuracy of early warning models. The substantial effect of revisions on the accuracy of early warning models, coupled with the finding of a relationship between revisions and exams, points to a substantial auditing role for on-site exams. More generally, our findings point to the need for care in the use of call report data for research in which the real-time flow of financial information is of some concern.Econometrics ; Banks and banking - Accounting ; Bank supervision

Financial statements and reality: do troubled banks tell all?

Each quarter, banks file a call report, or Report of Condition and Income, containing hundreds of accounting items pertaining to their financial condition. This article analyzes call report revisions to assess the extent to which regulatory exams promote accurate data. The findings indicate banks with new or emerging difficulties often significantly underreport these problems, intentionally or not. In addition, the findings point to a significant role for exams in uncovering financial problems and ensuring bank accounting statements reflect them. To the extent the loan-loss accounting in call reports is widely used to assess loan quality, these results support the view that exams are important in the public dissemination of accurate information on banks' financial condition.

Loss underreporting and the auditing role of bank exams

Using a unique set of banking data containing both originally reported and subsequently revised financial variables, we study the incidence of adverse revisions to accounting statements. As might be expected, our findings indicate banks are more likely to underreport financial losses when their financial performance is substandard. In addition, we provide evidence that supervisory exams have an important role in uncovering financial problems and ensuring bank accounting statements reflect them. Specifically, our estimations point to a significant auditing effect, through which exams can lead to a restatement of financial results to reflect a greater degree of financial difficulty than originally reported. Interestingly, this auditing role of exams is evident not only for institutions previously identified as supervisory concerns, but also at highly rated banks, where financial problems are only just emerging. Because a banking downturn would increase not only the number of problem institutions requiring additional supervisory attention, but also the incidence of loss underreporting at highly rated banks, our findings stress the value of efforts to maintain or bolster the supervisory system's capacity to expand exam activity quickly and substantially.Banks and banking - Accounting

Universal access, cost recovery, and payment services

We suggest a subtle, yet far- reaching, tension in the objectives specified by the Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA) for the Federal Reserve’s role in providing retail payment services, such as check processing. Specifically, we argue that the requirement of an overall cost-revenue match, coupled with the goal of ensuring equitable access on a universal basis, partially shifted the burden of cost recovery from high-cost to low-cost service points during the MCA’s early years, thereby allowing private-sector competitors to enter the low-cost segment of the market and undercut the relatively uniform prices charged by the Fed. To illustrate this conflict, we develop a voter model for what begins as a monopoly setting in which a regulatory regime that establishes a uniform price irrespective of cost differences, and restricts total profits to zero, initially dominates through majority rule both deregulation and regulation that sets price equal to cost on a bank-by-bank basis. Uniform pricing is dropped in this model once cream skimming has subsumed half the market. These results help illumine the Federal Reserve’s experience in retail payments under the MCA, particularly the movement over time to a less uniform fee structure for check processing.Payment systems ; Check collection systems

Financial liberalization, market discipline and bank risk

In the literature on systemic banking crises, two common themes are: (1) Risky lending often follows bank liberalization. (2) Lack of market discipline encourages risky lending. That not all liberalizations are followed by financial crisis and that financial systems without market discipline sometimes operate without incident invites examination of these themes. In a test of six countries, we find that our measure of bank risk increases significantly in the wake of financial liberalizations, but only where depositors fail to discipline banks. Our measures of market discipline and bank risk, however, are persistently inversely related

When does financial liberalization make banks risky? : an empirical examination of Argentina, Canada and Mexico

In the literature on systemic banking crises, two common themes are: (1) lack of market discipline encourages risky lending and (2) financial liberalization or privatization lead to risky lending. However, there is evidence to suggest that neither financial liberalization nor weak market discipline always precedes risky lending. We test for depositor discipline and, separately for post-liberalization or post-privatization risky lending in Argentina, Canada, and Mexico. In the countries without market discipline, lending risk increases significantly in the wake of liberalization. Where depositors discipline banks, banks neither behave riskily nor does their risk increase in the wake of privatization. ; Economic Research Working Paper 9905Banks and banking - Argentina ; Banks and banking - Canada ; Banks and banking - Mexico ; Financial crises